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I
INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of Japan, which became effective on May 3, 1947,
drastically reformed the Japanese judicial system.' For the first time in the
history of Japan, its constitution recognized the principle of separation of
powers between the various branches of government. The 1947 Constitution
conferred legislative powers on the Diet, placed executive power in the
Cabinet, and granted judicial power to the Supreme Court and those inferior
courts created by law. The new Constitution gave, also for the first time,
exclusive jurisdiction over all legal disputes to the judicial system and
empowered the courts to determine the constitutionality of any law, order,
regulation, or official government act.
This article examines the role of the Japanese judiciary and its status
within Japan's parliamentary system. The article begins with a review of the
history of the Japanese judicial system. It then examines the organization of
Japan's courts and their respective jurisdictions. Next, its focus shifts to
Japan's judges and the process of judicial selection. Finally, the article
discusses judicial appointment and its effect on judicial independence. The
relationship between appointment and independence is very important
because the power of reappointment places certain limitations on judicial
independence in Japan.
II
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM BEFORE THE

1947

CONSTITUTION

Until 1868, Japan was a feudal system governed by the Tokugawa
Shogunate. The emperor was a powerless monarch. The Shogunate
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administered a legal system founded on the codification of customary laws,
which emphasized consciousness of social status. 2 There was no distinct line
between administrative and judicial functions. Confucianism was adopted as
the official ideology and provided moral ideals on which the hierarchical social
relationships ofJapanese feudalism were founded. Customary law supported
the existing social order and legislation normally took the form of
administrative directives, regulations, or proclamations that dealt with matters
concerning the support of feudal regimes. Japanese laws, for the most part,
were a means of constraint or enforcement used by government authorities to
achieve government purposes and to maintain a strict code of social behavior
and relationships among Japanese people.3 A limited judicial system for
dispute resolution between private parties existed, but the rights of
4
individuals were not well respected, and people were expected to obey.
The Shogun was the military leader of Japan and delegated all power to
lower feudal lords or administrative entities. For example, "the shogun
delegated to the senior council (rojo), which delegated to the finance
commission (kanjo bugyo), which delegated to the deputy (daikan), who
looked to the village headman (nanushi), who looked to the chief of the fiveman group (gonin-gumi kashira), who looked to the househead, who
controlled the family members." 5 To criticize or challenge one's superiors in
this chain of command was a serious breach of loyalty and piety. One had no
legal right to challenge the authority of one's superiors in a court of law.
Courts were not clearly distinguished from administrative offices, and these
offices could not accept a petition by a Confucian inferior against a superior
6
without the superior's permission.
In 1868, the Meiji Restoration returned the emperor to power, abolished
the shogunate, and eventually resulted in modernization of the legal system.
The new structure of the government included a powerful executive
supported by a strong bureaucracy, a weak legislature, and a developing
judiciary. 7 In 1871, all civil and criminal cases were placed under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (Shihosho), which organized a national
judicial system. 8 The highest court (Daishin-in) was officially established in
1875 and modeled on the highest judicial court in France (Cour de
cassation). 9 Under the Imperial Japanese (Meiji) Constitution of 1889,Japan
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patterned after the Prussian constitution and based on the concept of
emperor sovereignty.' 0 Although the Constitution allocated legislative power
to the Diet, administrative power to the Cabinet, and judicial power to the
courts, the three powers were simply aspects of imperial sovereignty. They
did not involve true separation of powers, with its implied checks and
balances.
Under the Meiji Constitution, the emperor held sovereign power, and the
Courts, Diet, and Cabinet exercised their power in the name of the emperor.
The Diet had the power to enact laws; Cabinet ministers, acting for the
emperor, could also issue rules and regulations that had the force and effect
of laws. The judicial system established by the Court Organization Law
(Saibansho) of 1890 was modeled on the French and German judicial systems.
Those systems limited the jurisdiction of judicial courts to civil and criminal
matters involving private parties and assigned jurisdiction for administrative
cases to separate administrative courts.I The judiciary was part of the
Ministry of Justice and was organized into four levels: the Grand Court of
Judicature (Daishin-in), the court of appeals (kosoin), the district courts
(chih6 saibansho), and the ward courts (ku saibansho). Ward courts were the
courts of first instance over small claims and had "exclusive jurisdiction over
bankruptcy, land registration, and noncontentious matters related to family
law and succession."' 2 They were the only courts over which a single judge
presided. The district courts were courts of first-instance, general original
jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction from the ward courts. The courts of
appeal were intermediate appellate courts for the district courts. The
procedure in the courts of appeal was to retry cases on appeal for an error in
law or factfinding. The highest appellate court, the Grand Court of the
Judicature, heard appeals from the courts of appeal and, in cases of very great
importance, appeals directly from the district courts. Judges were selected for
appellate courts from the lower courts. Decisions were always given by the
13
whole court; no dissenting opinions were announced or published.
The judiciary was under the general supervision of the Ministry of Justice.
Although judges were supposedly independent from the Ministry in the
exercise of their judicial power, the judiciary was organizationally dependent
on it. The Ministry of Justice controlled all budgetary and administrative
matters of the judiciary, including the appointment, promotion, transfer,
supervision, and dismissal of judges and court officials. The Meiji
Constitution of 1889 did not provide for judicial independence and
10.
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specifically stated that "U]udicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law
according to law, in the name of the Emperor."' 14 The judiciary had no power
to review the constitutionality of legislation passed by the Diet and was bound
by all laws. The concept of absolute imperial sovereignty meant that there
was no such thing as an unconstitutional law.
Administrative acts of government were beyond judicial review. Judicial
courts could not try cases involving a dispute between private citizens and
administrative authorities of government. 15 In most instances, a private
citizen's complaint against a government official or agency required
submission to the supervising government office for corrective action of a
voluntary nature. Special courts, including an administrative court (gy6sei
saibansho) and a military court, were established in the executive branch of
government and had limited jurisdiction to hear appeals from certain
administrative actions of government. The administrative court had
6
jurisdiction only over appeals specifically permitted by statute or order.
The courts were quasi-judicial administrative agencies, in which retired
government officials served as judges. 1 7 These courts had different
procedural rules from ordinary courts, and no appeal could be taken from
their decisions.
The authors of the Meiji Constitution did not envision the Japanese
judiciary as a strong independent force in governmental decisionmaking. The
judiciary had no power or authority to review actions by the executive or
legislative branches of the government. A strong motive for the initial
establishment of the judiciary was to persuade Western foreign powers to
renegotiate their very favorable and unequal treaties with Japan and especially
to abandon extraterritorial privileges established by those treaties.' 8 Japan
restructured its legal system as part of its program to modernize its society
and thus to participate on equal terms in the international economic
marketplace and political arena.
Between 1870 and 1900, Japan made tremendous strides in modernizing
its legal system. TheJapanese followed the European models, particularly the
French and German. However, Japanese society as a whole had no knowledge
of the new European concepts of rights and duties. European legal codes
were predicated on a "society in which every individual is presumed free and
14. MEIJI CONST. art. 57; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 20.
15. MEIJI CONST. art. 61.
16. MEIJI CONST. art. 61; D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY, supra note 11, at 254.
17. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 21. This was "a system borrowed from France." Id. Cf the
Conseil d'Etat.
18. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 23. As a result of the lack of knowledge about Western law by
Tokugawa officials, the treaties thatJapan signed with Western nations were extremely prejudicial to
Japan's national interests. In order to protect its independence, Japan sought to establish a system of
government strong enough to discourage Western imperialism. To the Japanese, this meant rapid
Westernization of Japan's legal and political systems on the model of European nations and
subsequent revision of these disadvantageous treaties. H. TANAKA, supra note 4.
One treaty provision negotiated by the Tokugawa Shogunate stands out as particularly
unfavorable to Japanese sovereignty. This provision required that all Westerners accused of crimes
in Japan be tried in their home countries. D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY, supra note 11, at 75-76.
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and where loyal relationships are created by the

exercise of an individual's free will."19 The new Japanese legal system was
not meant to interfere with or to alter the morality of the Japanese people.
"Even the most progressive [Japanese] intellectuals toward the end of the
Edo period expressed this idea, and their motto was 'western techniques,
Oriental morality.' "20 This philosophy as put into practice was described by
Professor Yosiyuki Noda as follows:
Although Japan succeeded in faithfully imitating the French and German legal

(including judicial) systems, its own culture could not help but give an original
character to the system that was received. The rapid Europeanization was limited to

the field of state law, which dealt with only a small section of Japanese society.

Further, it must not be forgotten that the modernized law was put into operation by
men (including judges) whose outlook was determined by a peculiar set of
geographical and historical factors ....
For though the law can be changed from one
day to the next, the men to whom it is applied and those (including judges) who have

to apply it in the future cannot be changed that way! Japan was destined to remain a
21
long time subject to social rules that were quite foreign to the received law.

Like any other position in the Japanese government bureaucracy under the
old system, judgeships were career jobs. Judges were paid the same salary as
other career bureaucrats of the same rank. Judges, like public prosecutors
and lawyers, were recruited through a national examination. Through 1936,
persons passing the examination could enter private practice immediately
without any further training. Candidates for judges and public prosecutors
spent an additional eighteen months in training as judicial apprentices. At the
end of this supplemental training period, a second examination determined
whether these candidates became judges or public prosecutors. 2 2 After 1936,
an eighteen-month apprenticeship was made mandatory for all persons
23
seeking admission to the private-practice bar.

Newly selected judges received further on the job training as the junior
members of collegial courts. Judges could expect gradual promotion to
higher courts. Some judges were transferred to administrative positions in
the Ministry of Justice, where they served as bureaucrats supervising the
judicial system or preparing legislation for the Diet. After several years of
service as bureaucrats, these judges were usually transferred back to the
courts .24

Public prosecutors were also considered officers of the court. Their role
was modeled after the French legal system's procurator (procureur). They
were guardians of the social order and the public good. "Procurators not
19.

Y. NODA, supra note 3, at 58.

20.
21.

Id. at 60.
Id. at 58. "The biggest source of friction which ensued from the introduction of a modern

legal system in Japan was legal control of family life .

. .

. [A] sense of incompatibility between

tradition and the new law remained. One of the expressions of this feeling was the repeatedly
expressed doubt cast on the wisdom of solving disputes about domestic relations by way of formal
adjudication in courts." H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 455.
22. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 21.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id.
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only brought criminal prosecutions before a court, but also controlled the
police and even had theoretical power to watch over judges' work. ' 2 5 A
public prosecutor's office (kenjikyoku) was attached to each court.
Thus, judges and procurators appeared similar in function
courtroom, the public prosecutors sat on the elevated platform
defense counsel sat at floor level with the accused. The public
politically powerful and most young men aspiring
to the legal
26
become public prosecutors rather than judges.

to the laity. In the
with the judges. The
prosecutor office was
profession wanted to

Private practitioners enjoyed even less prestige than members of the
judiciary or public prosecutors. Private bar associations were under the close
supervision and control of the Ministry of Justice. Given the limited

jurisdiction of the Japanese judicial system, the private practice of law
consisted for the most part of representing small private clients in court by
humbly submitting their pleas to the dominant judges and public prosecutors.
Unlike their counterparts in other nations, particularly the United States,
Japanese lawyers did not argue novel issues of law or fight for social justice
2 7
through the judicial process.
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The Constitution gives the Diet and Cabinet the power to appoint and
reappoint judges. The Diet allocates funds from the national budget for the
judiciary and determines the number of judges in the lower courts, but has
never openly used this power to influence the judiciary's decisionmaking
process. But, as we shall see later, when the ruling party remains in power
over decades, the power of appointment and reappointment infringes on the
independence of the judiciary and its decisionmaking process.
Article 98 of the new Constitution declares that the Constitution is the
"supreme law of the land." 29 Article 81 safeguards rights created in the
Constitution by providing that the judiciary shall have the power to determine
the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official government
30
action when a question concerning its application is raised in a lawsuit.
Article 76 provides that the judiciary exercises the "whole judicial power." 3'
Judges are independent and bound only by the Constitution and laws enacted
pursuant to the Constitution. Unless they are judicially declared mentally or

physically incompetent to perform their official duties, judges cannot be
removed from their positions except through public impeachment by the
Diet.3 2 No disciplinary action can be administered against a judge by any
executive organ or agency.33 Salaries of Supreme Court and inferior court
34
judges cannot be reduced during their terms of office.
subconscious, and this subconscious factor plays an important role in the social life of the
Japanese people today.
Y. NODA, supra note 3, at 38-39. Long-held habits, beliefs, and attitudes are deeply rooted in the life
of the Japanese people. Id. at 38.
29. 1947 CONST. art. 98.
30. Id. art. 81; see also D. HENDERSON &J. HALEY, supra note 11, at 253.
31. 1947 CONST. art. 76.
32. 1947 CONST. art. 78.
In implementing this important provision, the Judge Impeachment Law establishes an
Impeachment Committee consisting of twenty members of the House of Representatives,
which performs the function of indictment, while an Impeachment Court of fourteen
judges, seven from each House of the Diet, is in charge of the decision. Impeachment trials
must be public. Any person may lodge a motion of impeachment with the Committee,
which may also take action on its own initiative. Because of the reluctance of the courts to
apply for impeachment procedure, a subsequent amendment imposed the duty on the
presidents of inferior courts to notify the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court whenever they
consider that there is a reason for removal by impeachment of a judge under their
jurisdiction. The Chief Justice must then request the committee to institute an indictment
for removal. He is also bound to do so if he has arrived at the same conclusion
independently of such notification.
Dismissal of judges for physical or mental incompetency, as well as disciplinary
punishment in cases where no removal is deemed necessary, remain within the prerogatives
of the courts on the basis of the Law Concerning the Status of Judges and other Court
Officials. When a judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court is involved, decision is
rendered by the Supreme Court, in all other cases by the High Court of the district in which
the judge holds office. Disciplinary punishment may be a reprimand or a nonpenal fine not
exceeding 10,000 yen.
Oppler, The Reform ofJapan's Legal andJudicial System under the Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REv. 290, 311 12 (1949); seeJudge Impeachment Law, Law No. 137, 1947.
33. 1947 CONST. art. 78.
34. Id. arts. 79(5), 80(2).
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The Constitution prohibits the establishment of any special administrative
court or extraordinary tribunal. It abolishes former administrative courts and
delegates all judicial power to the Supreme Court and the lower national
courts under its supervision. The Constitution draws a line between law and
administration and, for the first time in Japanese history, makes the judiciary
autonomous. The Constitution gives the judiciary the power to review the
legality and constitutionality of government administrative actions and
legislative enactments, and guarantees each citizen's right to have any "legal
controversy" resolved by the judiciary.
Article 77 gives rule-making power for judicial administration to the
Supreme Court and shifts responsibility for the supervision of the courts and
judges from the Ministry of Justice to the Supreme Court. 35 The Supreme
Court promulgates the rules of practice, procedure, and administration in the
judicial system. These rules and regulations also govern matters relating to
attorneys, the assignment of judges to specific courts, the appointment and
removal of court officials other than judges, and the financial affairs of the
judicial system.
In Japan's parliamentary government, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court has the same stature as the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the President of the House of Councillors. The Chief
Justice is designated by the Cabinet and appointed by the emperor. This
imperial appointment endows the Chief Justice with a degree of prestige
comparable to that enjoyed by the Prime Minister 3 6 and places the judiciary
on an equal footing with the legislative and executive offices of government
37
for the first time in the history of Japan.
IV
ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The Court Organization Law of April 16, 1947,38 went into effect on May
3, 1947, the same day that the new Constitution was promulgated. 39 The

Court Organization Law implemented Chapter VI, Articles 76-82, of the
Constitution, which provided for a completely new structure and role for the
judiciary. The new law divided judicial responsibilities among five different
courts: the Supreme Court, high courts, district courts, family courts, and
summary courts. Judges play the leading role in all civil and criminal
litigation. Witnesses are mainly questioned by the judge; there are no juries.
Lawyers often refrain from questioning witnesses if they believe their
35.
36.
37.

1947 CONST. art. 77.
T. MCNELLY, POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN 150 (2d ed. 1972).
The ChiefJustice's salary is equal to that of the Prime Minister, and the other justices receive

a salary equal to that of the other government ministers. J. NOMURA, JAPAN'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 5

(1981).
38.
39.

Court Organization Law, Law No. 59, 1947.
The 1947 Constitution was formally adopted by the old Imperial Diet in the fall of 1946.
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questioning may offend the judge. Upon his own motion, the judge may
initiate any investigation that he considers necessary. 40
It is important to remember that, unlike the United States federal system,
the Japanese judiciary is a national court system. The Supreme Court is the
head of the judiciary and can, without delegation from a statute enacted by
the Diet, promulgate rules to govern the administration of the judiciary
throughout Japan. The General Secretariat of the Supreme Court is the
judicial bureaucracy that manages the day-to-day operations of the judicial
system. Judges are assigned throughout Japan under uniform regulation to
4
achieve the goal of a homogenous judiciary. '
A.

Summary Courts

The 575 summary courts (kan-i saibansho) located throughout Japan have
authority to try civil cases not serious enough to warrant a formal trial and
involving claims not exceeding 900,000 yen (approximately $6000); minor
criminal cases punishable by fines and short-term imprisonment; and certain
designated criminal cases such as theft and embezzlement. Summary courts
can impose only fines and terms of imprisonment not exceeding three years.
All summary court cases are heard by a single judge. Judgment can be
rendered by the single judge or be issued by the court as a summary order. If
the summary court judge believes that a longer term of imprisonment is
required for the offense committed, the judge must transfer the case to the
district court. An appeal of a summary court ruling can be made to a higher
court.

42

Special proceedings are sometimes used in summary courts before the
actual trial of civil and criminal cases. Upon application from a creditor, the
summary court judge may issue an order for payment to the debtor without
giving the debtor a hearing (tokusoku procedure). In criminal cases, the
judge may impose a fine not exceeding 200,000 yen (approximately $1400)
after examining documentary evidence but before the defendant has any type
of hearing or trial. In traffic offense cases, the judge may also impose a fine of
200,000 yen after hearing the defendant's statement in open court and
examining the documentary evidence. These pre-trial summary proceedings
prior to trial do not deprive the debtor or the defendant of the right to
43
demand a trial.

Approximately 800 judges serve on the summary courts. 44 Areas of
greater population density have more courts and more than one judge.
40. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 23. In criminal cases, the public prosecutor's role was equally as
strong in Japan's French-styled preliminary hearing. The judge determined whether a case should
be prosecuted only on the basis of evidence presented by the public prosecutor. Id. See also George,
Rights of the Criminally Accused, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1990, at 71, 76.
41. H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 450.
42. Court Organization Law, art. 33; SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, OUTLINE OF THE JAPANESE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 8 (1983) [hereinafter OUTLINE].
43. Court Organization Law, art. 33; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 8.
44. JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 15.
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Special "summary court judges" are selected by a competitive examination
for persons such as court clerks, family court investigators, conciliators, and

prosecutors' clerks, who have engaged in legal work for many years. 4 5 These
persons also must be appointed by the -Cabinet after nomination by the
46
Supreme Court.
B.

The Family Courts

Family courts, created on
disputes and conflicts arising
significance. A family court is
division. The family division

January 1, 1949, have jurisdiction over all
out of family relationships and having legal
divided into a family division and a juvenile
handles disputes in family domestic matters

through conciliation conducted by ajudge and two conciliators. Thejuvenile

division handles cases involving defendants under twenty years of age. In
effect, it functions as a special criminal court. Proceedings in the family court
are informal and are not open to the public. 4 7 When conciliation fails, a more
formal procedure (shimpan) is conducted by a judge and ends in a decree.
A divorce action may be commenced in a district court only after
conciliation proceedings have concluded in the family division. If attempts to
reconcile the parties fail, the parties are encouraged to agree on an equitable
termination of all aspects of the marriage relationship. If the spouses cannot
agree on an equitable termination of the marital relationship, the spouse
seeking the divorce may then commence an action for divorce in a district
court.

48

All criminal cases in which the defendant is a juvenile must first be brought
in the juvenile division of a family court. After conducting hearings and
reviewing the nature of the offense charged and the available evidence, the
judge normally sends juveniles to a training school (reformatory), juvenile
home, or child guidance center, or places them on probation under the
supervision of a probation officer. The judge may also decide that a juvenile
over sixteen years of age should be treated as an adult. If this decision is
made, the judge transfers the case to the public prosecutor, who initiates a
49
criminal action against the juvenile in district court or summary court.
Family courts and their branch offices are found in the same locations as
district courts. Local sub-branch offices are located with the ninety-six
summary courts in remote areas of Japan. There are approximately 200
judges, 150 assistant judges, and 1,500 probation officers assigned to the
family courts.
45.

50

Court Organization Law, art 33; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 28.
1947 CONST. art. 80.
47. Court Organization Law, art. 31; Koji Shimpan H6 (Domestic Proceedings Law) arts. 9-16,
Law No. 15, 1947; Sh6nen H6 (juveniles Law), Law No. 168, 1948, art. 3-31; OUTLINE, supra note 42,
at 7-8.
48. Court Organization Law, art. 31; Domestic Proceedings Law, arts. 9-16; OUTLINE, supra note
42, at 7-8.
49. Court Organization Law, art. 31; juveniles Law, arts. 3-31; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 7-8.
50. OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 7.
46.
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District Courts

The district court is the court of general original jurisdiction for all cases
not under the original jurisdiction of another court. The district court also
has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from civil judgments in the summary
court. Although district court cases are normally heard by one judge, a panel
of three judges sits if the case is deemed very important. In practice, the great
majority of district court cases are heard by one judge. In appeals of civil
judgments from the summary courts, a three-judge panel is mandatory.
There are fifty district courts, one in each of Japan's forty-seven prefectural
units except for Hokkaido. Because of its large area, Hokkaido has four
judicial districts. Each district court has territorial jurisdiction over its
particular judicial district. The district courts have 242 branch offices and
approximately 870 judges and 460 assistant judges located throughout the
5
judicial districts. 1

When a three-judge panel delivers a judgment, the individual opinions of
judges are not published. There are no announced dissenting opinions if the
three judges disagree and cannot reach a consensus opinion. If disagreement
arises among the judges, a judgment is written based on the areas of
agreement of at least two of the judges. However, the judgment is signed by
52
all three judges to provide a consensus decision.
D.

The High Courts

There are eight high courts (koto saibansho), located in Tokyo, Fukuoka,
Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, Takamatsu, Sendai, and Hiroshima. Each high
court has its own territorial jurisdiction over a designated part of Japan and
has subject matter jurisdiction over appeals from judgments rendered by
district courts and family courts and over criminal verdicts issued by summary
courts. When both parties consent, an appeal from a civil judgment in the
summary court may be taken directly to the high court. The high courts have
original jurisdiction over election disputes, mandamus proceedings, petitions
for habeas corpus, and insurrection cases. The Tokyo High Court has
exclusive original jurisdiction to review the decisions of such quasi-judicial
53
agencies as the Fair Trade Commission and the Patent Office.

The approximately 290 high court judges are appointed by the Cabinet
from a list supplied by the Supreme Court. Each high court is supervised by a
chief judge (president), who is appointed by the Cabinet and given imperial
attestation. High courts in areas of greater population density have more
judges assigned to them. High court judges are often assisted by specially
assigned district court judges. Most cases in the high court are heard by a
three-judge panel. However, insurrection cases and disciplinary actions
51.

Court Organization Law, arts. 24-26; JusTIcE, supra note 2, at 13; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at

52.
53.

Court Organization Law, art. 26; J. NOMURA, supra note 37, at 7.
Court Organization Law, arts. 16-18; JusTIcE, supra note 2, at 12; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at

6.
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against a judge are heard by five-judge panels, as required by law. Like the
district court three-judge panels, high court judges render a unanimous
consensus decision in favor of the majority vote without any dissenting

opinions .54
E.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is Japan's highest court and is located in Tokyo. The
Cabinet appoints fifteen judges to the Supreme Court, and the emperor, after
one judge is designated by the Cabinet, appoints him as Chief Justice. These
appointments are subject to later review and approval by the voters. At the
first general election of the members of the House of Representatives
following an appointment, voters can vote for or against an appointee. 5 5 If a
majority of voters vote against an appointee, the justice is automatically

dismissed from the Supreme Court. This electoral review, which occurs every
ten years thereafter, was intended to assure democratic control over the
Supreme Court judicial appointment process in the newly created
independent judiciary. However, no justice has ever been removed from
office in this manner, and the Supreme Court has not been involved in
partisan politics, presumably because the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's
("LDP") long-standing dominance of Japanese politics has given it a
56
monopoly over the appointment of Supreme Court judges.
Persons appointed to the Supreme Court must have broad vision and
extensive knowledge of the law and be at least forty years of age. At least ten
of the justices must have served as a judge on the high court, district court, or
family court for not less than ten years, or have served as a judge of the
summary court, public prosecutor, lawyer, law professor or combination
thereof for a period of twenty years or more. Five justices need not have any
experience as a judge, lawyer, public prosecutor, or law professor. However,
57
they must be persons of great insight with a knowledge of the law.

There are generally five justices selected from among lower court judges
and five justices selected from the practicing bar. The other five justices may
be former public prosecutors, law professors, or government bureaucrats. In
appointing justices from the practicing bar, "great consideration is given to
regional balance." 5 8 Seniority and hierarchy also play an important role in
the selection process.5 9 Justices selected from the lower courts have usually
54.

Id.

55. 1947 CONST. art. 79(2).
56. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 24. Votes against sitting justices "have rarely exceeded one
percent." Id. The most votes ever cast against one judge is 11.05%. T. MCNELLY, supra note 36, at
181.
57. Court Organization Law. supra note 38.
58. Tanaka, The Appointment of Supreme CourtJustices and the Popular Review of Appointments, I I LAw
IN JAPAN:

AN ANNUAL 25,

28 (1978).

59.
The "ladders" to the Court are fairly well defined; they are also long, and rungs are seldom
skipped. In regard to the judiciary, the first and crucial rung ... was graduation from the law
faculty of Tokyo University[, the most prestigious university in Japan]. Graduation from Tokyo
University is probably significant to a judge's rise because of influential school cliques
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been president of a high court and have served as the secretary general of the
General Secretariat of the Supreme Court. 60 Justices selected from the
practicing bar generally have held the position of president or vice-president
of a major bar association. 6 1 The average age for justices at the time of
appointment is sixty-two or sixty-three; they serve until the mandatory
62
retirement age of seventy.
The Supreme Court hears appeals as a Grand Bench, composed of all
fifteen justices, or in one of three Petty Benches. Five justices are assigned to
each Petty Bench. If a case presents a question in which a new constitutional
ruling or judicial precedent may be forthcoming, it will be transferred to the
Grand Bench. The quorum for the Petty Bench is three; the quorum for the
Grand Bench is nine. However, at the level of the Grand Bench, a majority of
eight justices is needed to declare a law or regulation unconstitutional. 63
The Supreme Court, which has a very limited first instance jurisdiction,
exercises jurisdiction over appeals from the high courts. 64 In civil cases, the
(gakubatsu) in the judicial bureaucracy, and the Tokyo cliques apparently have controlled
promotions through the years. After graduation from Tokyo University, the typical steps
upward are: assistant judge, district judge (a long stay in Tokyo is helpful), high court judge,
president of one of the lesser high courts, president of the Tokyo High Court, and finally the
Supreme Court. Assignment to the Supreme Court as research official (chosakan) (rough
equivalent of a U.S. Supreme Court clerk) early in a judge's career is helpful, and selection as
president of the Legal Training and Research Institute is even better. Sometimes a president of
one of the larger high courts, such as Osaka's, has been appointed to the Supreme Court.
Although not every president of the Tokyo High Court has gone to the Supreme Court, when
there is a vacancy in the Court the Tokyo High Court president is usually the most visible
candidate.
Hierarchy appears also to operate in the appointment of lawyers to the Court. Seven out of
the first eight lawyers appointed have been presidents of Tokyo or Osaka bar associations, and
the eighth was chairman of an important committee of the Japanese Federation of Lawyers.
Japanese lawyers told me that when a lawyer on the Court retires, the presidents of the Tokyo
and Osaka bar associations are almost invariably considered; but often, it has been said, they
have declined appointment in recent years on the ground that it would entail financial sacrifice,
more work, and a less interesting life. Different hierarchical patterns to a position on the Court
now seem to be developing such as teaching at the Legal Training and Research Institute,
working in the Supreme Court Secretariat, or taking a high court appointment. . . . Graduation
from Tokyo University helps a lawyer in his rise to the Court, but it is not a necessity. ...
And hierarchy appears to be important in the appointment of men of learning and
experience. Procurators work their way up their own career ladder and come to the Supreme
Court when they reach superintendent procurator-general of a large district, or, as in one case,
assistant procurator-general. Law professors, with a single exception, have been members of the
most prestigious academic group in Japan-the Tokyo University law faculty. The others have
risen high in their professions-the former diplomat to the level of ambassador and the legal
bureaucrats to the level of director of legislative bureaus in the Diet. All were graduates of
Imperial Universities-thirteen from Tokyo and two from Kyoto.
Danelski, supra note 28, at 128-29.
60. "[T]here is a view that the justices who were experienced in the administration of the
judicial system prior to their appointment tend to be more flexible and to have more open views, and
that it is probably for these very qualities they were selected." Tanaka, supra note 58, at 29.
61. Id.

62.

Id.

63. Court Organization Law, arts. 9-10; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 5.
64. The Japanese Supreme Court is the court of first instance for the impeachment of the
Commissioner of the National Personnel Authority. The Supreme Court also has the power "to
decide by itself an action pending in an inferior court for petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by
issuing a writ of certiorari to the court." OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 4.
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main grounds for appeal are constitutional questions and questions of law. In
criminal cases, appeals are limited to constitutional questions and judgments
conflicting with prior decisions of the Supreme Court or decisions of other
high courts. In civil cases, with the agreement of both parties, an appeal may
be taken directly to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the district court.
In criminal cases, an appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court from
a judgment of the district court, family court, or summary court, declaring a
law, regulation or ordinance unconstitutional. If an appeal lacks sufficient
grounds, it is rejected by decision. This is not considered a judgment by the
Supreme Court. However, a Supreme Court ruling by either judgment or
65
decision is considered final.

Hearings before the Supreme Court normally involve the examination of
documentary evidence, but sometimes the parties are permitted to make oral
statements to the Court. When the Court announces a judgment, it seldom
gives its reasoning at that time. The text of the decision is later given to the
parties and made available to the public. Unlike the decisions of the district
66
and high courts, the decision clearly reports the opinion of each justice.
To assist the Supreme Court justices in their work, lower court judges are
selected as judicial research officials (saikosaibansho chosakan). These
judicial research officials, under the guidance of the justices, research
disputed points of law and report their findings back to the justices. They
play a major role in the work of the Supreme Court, which usually has
67
approximately 3,000 civil and criminal cases on its docket.

65. J. NOMURA, supra note 37, at 5; OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 10-11. The Japanese appellate
system provides ample opportunity for parties to use it as a device for delay or for forcing a
negotiated settlement. The caseload of the Supreme Court has been described as excessive. Koso
appeals, which are limited to the court of first appeal and to de novo review, permit parties the
freedom to introduce additional evidence. Jokoku appeals must be filed shortly after the court of first
appeal renders judgment and allow review only for errors of law. Jokoku appeals are much more
freely allowed to the Japanese Supreme Court than similar appeals to the United States Supreme
Court. H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 471, 475.
66. The revised Court Organization Law added the requirement that "[tihe opinion of every
Supreme Court justice shall be expressed in written decisions." Court Organization Law, art. 11.
This reform was very significant because it was a departure from traditional Japanese culture which
requires unanimous decisions and considers individual disagreement with the group undesirable and
improper. In the pre-1947 Supreme Court (Daishin-in), decisions were unanimous and there was no
open dissent. Open dissent with majority decisions was not permitted under the old Court
Organization Law. Kawashima, supra note 13, at 103-04.
67. OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 5. Chosen for their ability, these research assistants are likely to
be promoted in the judicial hierarchy after serving four or five years on the Supreme Court.
Unlike law clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court, research officials are not assigned to particular
justices. The civil and administrative research officials are assigned cases in the order they
are docketed and work with the justices to whom they have been assigned on the same
basis.... Since cases are also assigned to the justices in sequence according to the order in
which they are docketed, each of the research officials has an opportunity to work with each
of the justices.
Danelski, supra note 28, at 121-22.
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As previously stated, the Supreme Court is responsible for administration
of the judicial system without any intervention by the Diet or Cabinet. 68
Nationally, there are more than 20,000 employees other than judges under
the supervision of the Supreme Court; they include judicial research officials,
court clerks, probation officers, court stenographers, court attendants, court
executors, and court secretaries. 69 In carrying out this administrative
function, the Court exercises its rule-making power through the
administrative offices of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court also administers the Legal Training and Research Institute
(Shiho Kenshusho), the Research and Training Institute for Court Clerks, the
Institute for Family Court Probation Officers, and the Supreme Court
70
Library.
V
THE SELECTION OF THE JUDICIARY

A.

Supreme Court

The Constitution does not set forth any formal process for the selection of
Supreme Court justices (except for the chief justice), 7 1 and the Court
Organization Law does not limit the discretion of the Cabinet in appointing
justices. Professor Hideo Tanaka of the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law
concluded that the drafters of the Constitution and the Court Organization
Law intentionally sought to limit the independence of the judiciary through
the Supreme Court justice appointment process. 7 2
In making an appointment to the Supreme Court, the Cabinet consults
various sources, including the chief justice. However, there is no legal
requirement to seek outside opinions. The Court Organization Law
established an Advisory Commission on Judicial Appointments (Saibankan
Ninmei Shimon Iinkai) to assist in the selection of the first fifteen Supreme
Court justices in 1947, but the Commission was discontinued in 1948. All
subsequent attempts to establish a similar commission have failed in the
73
Diet.
68. The Grand Bench convenes weekly as a judicial assembly to discuss matters of judicial
administration, and acts through resolutions that are implemented by the General Secretariat of the
Supreme Court. J. NOMURA, supra note 37, at 5.
69. OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 10-11.

70.

JUSTICE,

supra note 2, at 10.

71.
1947 CONST. art. 6(2).
72. According to Professor Tanaka,
[tihe drafters were aware of the possibility of the development of a "judicial oligarchy" as
exemplified in the two hundred year history of the American Constitution during which the
Supreme Court, exercising the power of judicial review, on several occasions has for long
periods followed old-fashioned views of the Constitution and frustrated measures taken by
the legislature and the executive, which represent the people directly.
Tanaka, supra note 58, at 25-26.
73. Id. at 27. "[D]ue to the reluctance of theJapanese people to reject suggestions coming from
outstanding figures of public life, such as the committee members, [the commission] virtually had the
effect that the power of appointment shifted from the Cabinet, where it belonged constitutionally, to
the Committee." Oppler, supra note 32, at 309-10 n.6 2 .
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As noted above, in general, five of the fifteen Supreme Court justices have
been selected from career judges, five from private attorneys, and five from
public prosecutors, law professors, or career civil servants specializing in lawrelated matters. Careerjudges appointed to the Supreme Court are normally
presidents of a high court at the time of appointment. Consequently, they
have been promoted through the ranks of the hierarchical personnel system
of the Japanese judiciary in a manner similar to government bureaucrats and
similar to the manner of judicial promotion under the Meiji Constitution.
Private attorneys appointed to the Supreme Court have traditionally risen
through the ranks of the Japanese Bar Association (Nichibenren), or a major
practicing attorney bar association, such as Tokyo's or Osaka's, to the position
of president or vice-president, symbolizing a general consensus of support by
members of the private bar. Public prosecutors appointed to the Supreme
Court are usually high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Justice. Law
professors are typically appointed from the most prestigious faculties of law,
most predominantly the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law. Finally, the small
number of civil servant appointees include career diplomats and top officials
7
in agencies or ministries. "
This method of judicial selection leads to the appointment of elder
statesmen who are near the end of their professional careers. Appointment to
the Supreme Court may appear to be a final reward for a long and
distinguished career of public service. Some question whether high
statesmanship should be a characteristic desirable in a Supreme Court
judge.

75

After a Supreme Court justice is appointed, he is constitutionally subject
to a review of his appointment and initial performance at the next general
election. The emphasis on sovereignty of the people in the Constitution is the
underlying reason why Supreme Court justices must face popular review at
the polls. In practice, this popular review system makes removal of justices
extremely difficult. The review occurs approximately a year and a half after
appointment, at a time when a justice has participated in very few decisions.
The voters are little concerned with reviewing Supreme Court justices as
compared with electing representatives, and the newly appointed justices have
not been on the Court long enough to permit an informed decision as to their
attitudes and fitness. 76 The next popular review ten years later, when a
lengthy record of performance exists, has very little significance; the average
tenure of ajudge from appointment to mandatory retirement at age seventy is
currently seven to eight years. Therefore, justices are appointed with the
expectation that they will serve for less than ten years. Popular review, then,
is more a symbolic gesture of sovereignty of the people than an effective check
77
on the appointment of justices by the Cabinet.
74.
75.
76.
77.

H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 693-94.
See id at 694.
Tanaka, supra note 58, at 35-36.
Oppler, supra note 32, at 310; see also TANAKA, supra note 4, at 694.
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Inferior Courts

Legal education in Japan begins with admission to a university law faculty.
Unlike American legal education, the study of law in Japan is an
undergraduate curriculum; the Japanese law faculties' primary purpose is not
to prepare persons to enter the legal profession. Of the four-year university
education, approximately two years are spent taking general education
courses prior to concentrating on the study of law in the last two years.
Students are taught some aspects of case analysis as they study the Japanese
legal system and its mixture of civil law, common law, and Japanese
tradition. 78 Students are also given a general background of legal knowledge
necessary for a career in business or government. Very few graduates of the
faculty of law actually become lawyers or judges.
Those graduates who want to become lawyers, judges or prosecutors must
pass the National Legal Examination (Shiho-shiken) and qualify to enter the
Legal Training and Research Institute ("LTRI"). Approximately 700 of
35,000 applicants pass the examination, which is given once every year.
These trainees receive eight months of classroom instruction at the LTRI and
sixteen months of field training during which they perform the same kind of
work as judges, prosecutors, and attorneys. From each graduating class,
"seventy to eighty [students] become assistant judges, thirty to forty become
public prosecutors and the rest become practitioners." 7 9 Judicial aspirants
are then separated from the other trainees.
They receive intensive training, the rationale being that the judges are a special breed
of government servant and require a high caliber of legal professionalism .... Top
students at the institute are often persuaded to become judges....
Since 1972, a newly appointed assistant judge receives job training at the Tokyo
District Court and also studies at the Japanese Research and Training Institute
("JRTI") for four months. Under the supervision of a presiding judge, he participates

It is, of course, true that if the judicial branch is swayed by the will of the people in every
case, it may not fulfill its role, in particular, the protection of the rights of the minority.
However, in consideration of the principle that sovereign power resides in the people, it is
also undesirable that the judicial branch be isolated from the will of the people for any long
period of time in view of the fact that the Constitution of Japan empowers the courts to
review the constitutionality of any legislation enacted by the Diet, whose members are
elected by the voters. The Constitution attempts to bring the judicial branch closer to the
people through the system of popular review.
In other words, if a deadlock situation arises between the judicial branch and the
executive and/or the legislative branch, the popular review system would serve as an
"emergency exit." There is a view that, since there is no case of a justice being removed
from office by the electorate, the review system is useless. However, this is like saying that
since there has been no fire and no one has had to escape by the emergency exit, the
emergency exit is useless.
Tanaka, supra note 58, at 33.
78. Beer, Constitutionalism and Rights in Japan and Korea, in CONSTiTurrIONALiSM AND RIGHTS 225,
239 (L. Henkin & A. Rosenthal eds. 1990).
79. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 29. The number of lawyers in Japan has not increased greatly
since the 1960s. Pro se suits are permitted and deemed necessary in some localities where there are
few practicing lawyers. Representation by a lawyer is not required at any level of the Japanese court
system. "In view of the fact that a substantial amount of litigation is conducted without participation
of lawyers on either side or one side, judges must adapt procedure so that any injustice will not result
from it." Taniguchi, Litigation in Japan 19-20 (unpublished paper).
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in collegiate decision making and assists in analyzing legal issues, the facts of a case,
sentencing, and opinion writing. Also, since 1974, an assistant judge of less than five
years of service has been assigned to a single bench in order to learn how to read trial
records, sort out disputed points, deliberate, and draft a court opinion. However, he
does not participate in decision making. . . . An assistant judge after the initial five
years, is expected to work as a full judge .... At the end of ten years, or approximately
at age forty, the assistant judge is up for reappointment and promotion to full judge,
8°
and sits on the right side of the presiding judge or sits alone in a one-man court.

This unified training program has improved the quality of the private bar
and enhanced unity in the legal profession. There is a much better
understanding and mutual respect between the private and public bars,
including judges and public prosecutors. This respect and mutual
understanding were lacking during the period between 1868 and 1946, when
candidates for judges, prosecutors, and private lawyers were trained
separately.
Only graduates of the LTRI who pass the final qualifying examination can
be appointed assistant judges. Assistant judges, who serve with judges on the
district and family courts, can serve only as members of a three-judge panel
and cannot render a judgment independently. While in theory a person can
also be appointed a full judge after ten years of experience as a public
prosecutor, practicing lawyer, or law professor, in practice only assistant
judges are made full judges. 8 ' The retirement age for judges of inferior
82
courts is sixty-five.
Summary court judges are generally selected from a pool of persons with
three or more years' experience as assistant judges, public prosecutors, or
practicing lawyers. However, other persons of ability are also eligible for
appointment as summary court judges. 83 Difficulties in recruiting persons for
the lower-paid category of summary court judge forced the Diet to raise the
retirement age to seventy years. 8 4
The courts in Japan are strained to capacity. Excessive caseloads result
from a lack ofjudges. The number ofjudges has grown very little since 1890;
the ratio of judges to the population has fallen more than two-thirds. 8 5 The
failure of Japan to provide more judges has been clearly a matter of
86
government policy.
80.

H.

ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME

COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES

28-29 (1989).

81. OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 9. After five years and with the approval of the Supreme Court,
an assistant judge can serve in the capacity of a full judge. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 30. "The
appointment of practicing lawyers to the bench occurred only in the early post-war period, although
the practice is strongly advocated by Japanese bar associations." Id. However, this argument is not
practical because, except for the Supreme Court and its accompanying prestige, the salaries ofjudges
are substantially lower than the income earned by members of the private bar. Id.
82. Court Organization Law, art. 50.
83. OUTLINE, supra note 42, at 9.
84. Court Organization Law, art. 50; Oppler, supra note 32, at 311 n.67.
85. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 381 (1978).
Hozumi, Compromise in the Course of Litigation, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 97-110 (1973).
86.

Haley, supra note 85, at 385.

See Ohta &
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VI
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF

1947

The new Constitution explicitly affirms the independence of the judiciary;
its promulgation gave new meaning to the concept of judicial independence
in Japan. Article 76(3) provides that "[a]ll judges shall be independent in the
exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by the Constitution and
the laws." '8 7 With the separation of the judiciary from the Ministry of Justice,
the power and prestige of the public prosecutors diminished as the power and
prestige of the judiciary increased. In comparison to other government
bureaucrats, the salaries of judges increased dramatically. The public
prosecutor's power to control police was eliminated, and public prosecutors'
offices were no longer housed in the same building as the court.8 8 The public
prosecutor's role was limited to criminal prosecutions before the court.
The judicial career path is very bureaucratic. Judges advance in their
careers through promotion by the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court.
The ultimate danger with this process is that judges seeking promotion may
sacrifice their individual judicial independence by not rendering controversial
decisions. In a society that prides itself on consensus decisionmaking,
conformity, and homogeneity, this tendency can deter the development of a
truly independent judiciary. The Supreme Court, made up of appointees by
the Cabinet, has the power to refuse to recommend the appointment of an
LRTI graduate to the bench or the reappointment of a judge by the Cabinet at
the end of a ten-year term.
The Supreme Court's power of nomination and the Cabinet's power of
appointment are potentially very strong limitations on true judicial
independence; lower court judges are subject to reappointment every ten
years. The power to nominate, to promote, and to assign judges to the
various judicial districts can be used by the Supreme Court in its
administrative capacity to influence the decisionmaking process of lower court
judges. Retired ChiefJustice Takashi Hattori has described this situation as a
potential conflict between the judge's independence to decide cases and the Supreme
Court's power of administrative supervision .... The generally accepted standard is
that, while the Supreme Court is not allowed to order a judge to do or not to do
something in connection with a case before him on the pretext of administrative
supervision, it may issue general instructions to judges with regard to the disposition
such instructions, then the Court
of judicial business as a whole. If a judge ignores
89
may take measures appropriate to the situation.

The important point about the power of reappointment is that, unlike
judicial impeachment or disciplinary proceedings, no reason need be given
87. 1947 CONST. art. 76(3). This meets the definition of judicial independence set forth by
Judge Irving Kaufman, Chief Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
He states that judicial independence must be "defined to achieve the essential objective of the
separation of powers that justice be rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice." Kaufman,
The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671, 701 (1980).

88.

Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 29.

89. Hattori, The Role of the Supreme Court ofJapan in the Field of JudicialAdministration, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 69, 82-83 (1984).
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for failing to renominate a judge. Both discipline and impeachment require a
legal justification acceptable to the legal process in Japan. The power of
reappointment is a much more coercive tool in influencing the behavior of
lower court judges. Professor Yosiyuki Noda concludes that the Supreme
Court's reappointment power makes judges "obliged to fall in with the
opinion of the Supreme Court in the exercise of their functions. That
includes falling in with its political standpoint .... Some, therefore, think

that the independence of the lower court judges is more apparent than
real." 90
The reappointment process of lower court judges is not simply a formality;
the judge's performance of his duties is reviewed every ten years. "Lower
court judges are evaluated partly on the basis of work efficiency of case loads
and decisions that can withstand review by a higher court." 9 ' This review
examines the political nature of a judge's decisions and may penalize the
judge who tries to be too independent and vote his conscience. Review based
on these criteria encourages judges to follow precedent in decisionmaking.
The review process may also inhibit the natural development and evolution of
the law that might take place if the judiciary were truly independent.
As an example, the Japanese Supreme Court has been reluctant to exercise
judicial review of government administrative action. This reluctance may
stem from the sense of unity with government or may be a product of the
desire to avoid confrontations that may jeopardize the status and prestige of
the judiciary. The 1947 Constitution makes the Diet "the highest organ of
state power" and gives it the power of investigation into the affairs of state,
including the activities of the judiciary. 9 2 The Supreme Court continues to
honor this Diet's position as the highest organ of state power. However, to be
truly independent, the judiciary must confront government agencies when
necessary to protect rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Knowing that the
Supreme Court is reluctant to exercise judicial review in this area and that the
Court has complete discretion in exercising the power of reappointment,
lower court judges may be discouraged from exercising judicial review of
government administrative acts. But the district court judges have repeatedly
held laws and government actions unconstitutional and have been
subsequently overruled by a high court or the Supreme Court.
90. Y. NODA, supra note 3, at 154.
91. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 274.
92. 1947 CONST. arts. 41, 62. In 1948, the Committee of Legal Matters of the Upper House,
relying on this latter constitutional provision, started an investigation into an actual criminal case and
published a resolution that the court's finding in the case had been erroneous and the punishment
too light. The Supreme Court, by a resolution of the Judicial Conference, promptly countered and
criticized the action of the Committee as improperly interfering with the exercise of the judicial
power and violating judicial independence. Most academic views and public opinion sided with the
Court. Since this happening, known as "The Urawa Incident," there fortunately have been no
similar occurrences. The legislature seems to show more self-restraint today. The prevailing
academic view is that the investigatory powers of the Diet is only supplementary to the legislative and
budgetary powers, and cannot be exercised to oversee the activities of an individual judge in a
particular case. Taniguchi,Japan, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 205-16 (S.Shetreet &J. Desch~nes eds.
1985).
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The General Secretariat of the Supreme Court effectively controls all
significant aspects of judicial training and administration, including judicial
appointments, assignments, promotions, and dismissals. The General
Secretariat has complete control over the LRTI. Administrators appointed by
the General Secretariat are responsible for the operation of each court. These
administrators working with other members of the General Secretariat's
bureaucracy monitor the activities and performance of all lower court judges.
Japanese lower court judges are well protected from direct outside
influences in exercising their judicial duties, but these judges may feel
pressure from the judicial bureaucracy itself. "The judiciary as an
independent organization has become a huge bureaucratic body in which
judges are constantly moved and promoted." 9 3 Although judges can be
transferred from one court to another only with their consent, 94 a failure to
consent may mean the judge is not recommended for a promotion. "More
seriously, the judgment of courts could be affected if a judge thinks a certain
decision would be frowned upon by the Supreme Court, and fears his
promotion might be retarded." 9 5 As long as the judiciary takes the form of a
civil service, judges are under some influence from the judicial bureaucracy.
This bureaucratic control, to some extent, is necessary to maintain
independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches of
96
government under the present constitutional scheme.
Judges' performances are monitored and graded by the judicial
bureaucracy. Judges who refuse to emphasize conciliation as a means of
clearing cases from their dockets may find themselves assigned to some
unimportant administrative post or court. "Compromise may be considered
as a deceptive means of attempting to reduce excessive judicial workloads
through the simplification of justice instead of adopting fundamental
measures to eliminate the judge's heavy burdens, such as increasing the
number of judges or reforming court procedures. '9 7 In exercising its control
of the judicial administration, the General Secretariat through the Supreme
Court has refused on very rare occasions to nominate ajudge for appointment
or reappointment. The undisclosed but suspected reason for the refusals was
the judge's leftist political or Communist affiliation. 98
The end of the American occupation ofJapan in 1952 was the start of the
revisionist debate on the American-style Constitution. Conservative elements
within government and the LDP wanted to revise the Constitution and
reintroduce nationalist ideology. Chief Justice Tanaka of the Supreme Court
was strongly anticommunist, and his appointment as Chief Justice "coincided
with the retirement of liberal judges like Tsuyoshi Mano, Katsushige Kotani,
93.

Taniguchi, supra note 92, at 215.

94.

Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 216.
See Ohta & Hozumi, supra note 85.
Taniguchi, Le Cas DuJapan, in LE CONTROLEJURISDICTIONNEL
H. TANAKA, supra note 4, at 558-62.

DES Lois 175-90 (1986).

See
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Shunzo Kobayashi, and Tadaichiro Tanimura who had been appointed by the
Socialist Katayama Cabinet in 1947." 99 In his 1952 annual New Year's
address to the judicial conference of directors and presidents of lower courts,
Justice Tanaka said:
The red imperialism of communism has expanded beyond the place of its origin and
started to reveal its ambition to conquer the world .... Anyone who believes in
neutrality must be criticized for his lack of moral belief because goodness,
justice and
00
freedom can never be compromised with evil, injustice, and slavery.'

To counter this anticommunist ideology and to protect the Constitution
from the revisionist elements of the extreme right, approximately 270 young
lawyers, judges, and professors in 1954 established the Young Lawyers
Association or Seihokyo (Seinen Horitsu Kyokai). "By 1971, [Seihokyo]
membership had grown to over 2,150 (1500 lawyers, 230 judges, 170 or more
[Japan Research and Training Institute] trainees, 250 scholars and
intellectuals)."'' 0 The growth in the Seihokyo was reflected in the activist
judicial behavior of lower court trial judges who made a series of
"antigovernment decisions in cases involving such politically hot issues as
public safety ordinances, labor-management disputes, and the United States02
Japan security treaty."1
The Seihokyo was a prominent organization in the early environmental
pollution litigation in Japan. The success of this litigation and its widespread
publicity revealed to the LDP and conservative elements of the government
bureaucracy the true potential of an independent judiciary in bringing about
social change. In the environmental litigation, the judiciary had been
sympathetic to the human rights of the pollution victims who were receiving
no relief from government agencies or compensation from the offending
companies. The pollution victims, after years of failure in seeking relief
outside of the judicial process, sought relief in the courts. The courts ruled in
03
favor of the victims and ordered the offending companies to pay damages.'
Lawyers who were members of the Seihokyo represented the plaintiffs in these
environmental cases, and judges who were either members of or sympathetic
to Seihokyo participated in rendering these decisions.
Chief Justice Tanaka was followed by another anticommunist LDP
appointee, ChiefJustice Kazuto Ishida, during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In 1970, the Ishida Court took disciplinary action against eight Seihokyo0 4
affiliated judges. 1
Between 1970 and 1976, twenty-four trainees were denied appointment to judgeships,
of which seventeen were YLA (Seihokyo) members. On May 2, 1970, Ishida told the
press that a person who was an ultranationalist, nihilist, militarist, or communist was
not qualified to be a desirable type of judge, at least as a matter of ethics, and urged
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 258.
Id. (citing H. WADA, SAIKO SAIBANSHO RON (ON THE SUPREME COURT) 217 (1971)).
Idat 259.
Id.
See J. NOMURA, supra note 37, at 6. See also J.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAw IN JAPAN 34-37 (1981).
104. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 259.
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extremely careful use of judicial review. Ishida apparently had in mind some judges
who were affiliated with the leftist-oriented YLA (Seihokyo) .... On June 29, 1970, this
remark of Ishida was made the grounds for an impeachment lodged against him by
twenty-nine legal scholars and lawyers who complained that his remarks against "ists"
threatened judicial freedom of thought and conscience. Also, a petition containing
the signatures of 2,208 lawyers demanding Ishida's resignation was submitted to the
Supreme Court by a group called the liaison conference to protect judicial
against
independence. Like all previous attempts to impeach justices, this charge
0
Chief Justice Ishida was dismissed by the Diet impeachment committee.1 5

The judicial bureaucracy and other extremely conservative political groups
then began an intense campaign to discourage judges from affiliating with
Seihokyo. Secretary General Kishi of the General Secretariat of the Supreme
Court urged judges to maintain a position of strict neutrality and to refrain
from letting their courtrooms "become arenas in which political opposition to
government policies [was] carried out." 0 6 The national conference of high,
district, and family courts then passed a unanimous resolution that judges
should withdraw from membership or affiliation with Seihokyo. Judges working
in the General Secretariat were advised to give up their affiliation with
Seihokyo. Ten assistant judges attached to the General Secretariat withdrew
from Seihokyo. t07 Without issuing any explicit directives, a climate was created
in the judicial system which made membership in Sethokyo extremely
detrimental to a successful career as a judge.
The Ishida Court continued its assault on judicial independence in 1971,
when Assistant Judge Yasuaki Miyamoto from the Kumamoto District Court
was denied reappointment as a district court judge.' 0 8 The Supreme Court
did not nominate Judge Miyamoto, a member of Seihokyo, for reappointment.
The General Secretariat declared that Judge Miyamoto's membership in
Seihokyo was not the ground for the Supreme Court's refusal to nominate, but
refused to give the judge any reasons for the decision.' 0 9 The Supreme Court
was widely criticized for its failure to recommend Judge Miyamoto, and some
scholars argued that the Supreme Court's action would discourage the
freedom and independence of judges and subordinate the judiciary to the
influence of politics.' 10
Another example of bureaucratic interference in the judicial process
involves the "Hiraga Memorandum." Farmers in Hokkaido filed suit in the
Sapporo District Court against the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry.'"
The farmers wanted to halt the construction of a Self-Defense Force military
base on forest land under the control of the government. A three-judge panel
headed by Chief Judge Shigeo Fukushima heard the arguments in this case.
105. Id.; see Taniguchi, supra note 92.
106. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 260.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 261-62; Taniguchi, supra note 92; Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 30.
109. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 261-62; Taniguchi, supra note 92. The Supreme Court has
complete discretion in this appointment process, and its decisions are virtually unreviewable by any
other branch of government.
110. Id.
11. Ito v. Agricultural Minister, 712 Hanrei Jih6 26 (Sapporo Dist. Ct., Sept. 7, 1973); see
Taniguchi, supra note 98, at 179.
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During the trial, Kenta Hiraga, director of the Sapporo District Court, sent a
memorandum to Judge Fukushima and Assistant Judge Hiroshi Hirata,
another member of the three-judge panel. The letter offered "friendly advice
from a senior colleague" and suggested that Judges Fukushima and Hirata
render a decision in favor of the government. Ignoring this "friendly advice",
Judge Fukushima, a member of Seihokyo, and Judge Hirata rendered a decision
favorable to the farmers which was reversed on appeal to'the Sapporo High
Court.' 12
After he publicly announced his decision in the case, Presiding Judge Fukushima
brought the memorandum (from Hiraga) to the attention of his colleagues and the
judicial conference of his court. It appears that he held the memorandum in strict
confidence until after sealing of the decision. Both the Sapporo District Court and the
Supreme Court issued statements regretting that Hiraga exceeded the limit ofjudicial
propriety and brought public doubts upon judicial independence and fairness of a
trial. Hiraga was transferred to the Tokyo High Court as a disciplinary measure, a
measure which looked more like a promotion than a demotion! The Supreme Court
also mildly admonished Judge Fukushima when it stated that 'judges should not fall
into the error of self-importance, but should always be humble enough to try to build
up character and competence by exchanging experience and knowledge among
themselves."..... Meanwhile, a Diet impeachment court was formed upon the petition
entered by the Tokyo and Sapporo Bar Associations, and on October 9, 1976, voted
no impeachment against Hiraga but deferred judgment upon Fukushima until it would
have in its hands all the returns on an inquiry it had sent to over 200 judges whose
memberships in YLA (Seihokyo) was being made a basis for an impeachment inquiry.
The majority of the judges who had received such an inquiry refused to respond by
not affirming or denying their membership in the YLA (Seihokyo). Subsequently, the
committee chairman stated that although his committee would not draw the
conclusion that a failure to respond to the inquiry would automatically imply
membership in the association if the judges did not respond[,] he would have to
undertake other means of investigation. The committee dominated [by] the LDP
members proceeded to impeach Fukushima on the charge of having violated judicial
propriety in publishing the Hiraga memorandum, but suspended the proceedings
against him during good behavior. When the Sapporo High Court responded to the
Diet decision with a similar oral reprimand to him, Judge Fukushima submitted his
resignation by stating that the court abandoned judicial independence and bowed to
political pressure. After persuasion by his friends and colleagues, he withdrew his
resignation and retracted the above statement ....113

The Hiraga memorandum incident and subsequent political pressure from
the conservative right wing of the LDP Diet members prompted the Supreme
Court and its General Secretariat to use informal advice to encourage judges
to withdraw from membership in or affiliation with Seihokyo. As a result of
pressure from senior judges and the General Secretariat, many younger
judges withdrew from Seihokyo membership.
Other reported incidents raise suspicions that indirect pressure from the
General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, the Diet, and the Cabinet,
4
dominated by the LDP, might endanger the independence of the judiciary. 1
112. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 266-68; see Taniguchi, supra note 92, at 215-16.
113. H. ITOH, supra note 80, at 266-68.
114. Taniguchi, supra note 98, at 179. In 1972, the Supreme Court questioned the
reappointment of Judge Konno under the jurisdiction of the Nagoya High Court. This judge was
also a Seihokyo member. The chiefjudge of the Nagoya High Court conducted a hearing on the judge
who subsequently withdrew his application for reappointment. This information is based primarily
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The nomination process operates in such a way that nomination by the
Supreme Court is tantamount to appointment as a judge; the number of
nominated candidates for judicial appointment typically equals the number of
vacancies, and the Cabinet essentially appoints those candidates so
nominated.' 15 However, it is too simplistic to conclude that the Cabinet has
no impact on the appointment process. In Japan, it would be a major loss of
status and prestige for the Supreme Court if one or more of its judicial
nominations were rejected or ignored by the Cabinet. Therefore, the
formality of the Cabinet appointment process forces the Supreme Court to
nominate persons within a minimally acceptable range of qualifications and
political beliefs.' 16
Despite the pressure for conformity imposed by the Supreme Court, lower
court judges tend to be more liberal and more protective of fundamental
human rights than Supreme Court justices. There is no doctrine of stare
decisis in Japan; consequently, court decisions, including those of the
Supreme Court, do not constitute binding precedent. Lower court judges
have the discretion to render decisions that differ from prior Supreme Court
decisions on the same subject. 117 However, very few lower court decisions
have dramatically differed from prior Supreme Court decisions on the subject.
In essence, the judicial reappointment system is a check on judicial
independence and apparently has the effect of binding lower court judges to
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. This result is probably an unstated
goal of the Supreme Court, which would prefer not to have an unpopular
decision made by a lower court, or not to make an unpopular decision in
overturning a lower court; such decisions receive too much publicity from the

on research conducted under my supervision by a Japanese LLM student at the Duke University
School of Law and on conversations with Japanese attorneys. "In 1987, it was revealed that in
December 1983, the Supreme Court had summoned judges involved in some forty flood-related suits
in various parts of the country, and told them how it would decide in an upcoming verdict
concerning government responsibility for river management."

K. VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF

218 (1989). See also Itoh, supra note 80, at 249-79.
115. Y. NODA, supra note 3, at 153-54.
116. At the 1970 Constitution Day celebration, Supreme Court Chief Justice Kazuto Ishida said
that "those who are extreme militarists, anarchists, or clearly communists, do not make suitable
judges .... ." H. ITOH & L. BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: SELECTED SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS, 1961-70, at 17 (1978). This statement implies that someone with extreme views
would not be recommended for appointment to thejudiciary. However, this situation does not differ
greatly from the judicial appointment process in the United States. The difference is in the definition
of what constitutes an "extreme viewpoint." Ardent advocacy of women's rights or fundamental
human rights may constitute an "extreme viewpoint" in Japan. It is doubtful a Thurgood Marshalltype advocate of civil rights could be nominated to the Japanese Supreme Court.
117. When a Supreme Court decision declares a law unconstitutional, the decision does not mean
the elimination of the unconstitutional provision; the Supreme Court's decision is only forwarded to
the Diet. The Diet can then amend the law, remove it, or do nothing and leave it in effect. Legally,
these decisions of unconstitutionality can be applied only to the parties affected by the decision.
"Until the Diet acts, the possibility remains that the same question might again be brought before the
Supreme Court." Ukai, The Significance of the Reception of American Constitutional Institutions and Ideas in
Japan, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE 120 (L. Beer ed.
1988).
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media. This publicity could jeopardize the judiciary's status and prestige
gained under the Constitution less than fifty years ago."18
VII
CONCLUSION

To ensure a fair judicial process, judges must exercise their authority
independently, bound only by the Constitution and the law, free from
unreasonable interference by the executive and legislative branches of
government and their superiors within the judicial system. Judicial
independence is threatened by the Japanese Supreme Court's bureaucratic
control over the promotion and appointment process. The Supreme Court is
subject to political pressure because its justices are appointed by the Cabinet
and its budget and the number of lower court judges are controlled by the
Diet. The Cabinet has had a significant role in shaping the Supreme Court
because the LDP has been in almost continuous control of the Cabinet and
the appointment process since the Constitution of Japan was put in force in
1947.' 19
Bar associations
criticize what has
been called the
"bureaucratization" of the Supreme Court and the judiciary.120 Although it is
a power yet to be exercised, the Cabinet can refuse to appoint or to reappoint
lower court judges recommended by the Supreme Court. The power to
refuse reappointment is ever-present and may inhibit the entire judiciary from
rendering controversial political decisions, particularly decisions adverse to
the power and prestige of the LDP and to the maintenance of Japan's national
and social order.
During its first thirty years, the Supreme Court frequently resorted to its
power ofjudicial review but only rarely exercised it. Only five decisions were
rendered holding an administrative regulation, legal procedure, or Diet
legislation unconstitutional.' 2 1 Between 1973 and 1976, the Supreme Court
held three statutes unconstitutional, but the sudden exercise of its power of
118. Beer, Japan's ConstitutionalSystem and Its Judicial Interpretation, 17 LAw IN JAPAN 21 (1984).
119. Professor Yoshiaki Yoshida has written that this appointment process makes it difficult for a
Supreme Court to carry out its role as a guardian of human rights in cases posing constitutional
challenges or on issues over which a majority of the electorate, Diet, or Cabinet express their
dissatisfaction. Y. Yoshida, Asian Constitutions: Characteristics and Present Situations 14 (1989)
(General Report, International Symposium on Asian Constitutions sponsored by Japan Branch of the
International Association of Constitutional Law).
120. Taniguchi, supra note 12, at 30.
121. D. HENDERSON &J. HALEY, supra note 11, at 255 (citing K.K. Sumiyoshi v. Governor of
Hiroshima Prefecture, 29 Minshfi 572 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 30, 1975); Aizawa v.Japan, 27 Keishfu 256
(Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 14, 1973); Nakamura v.Japan, 16 Keish6i 1577 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Nov. 28, 1962);
Tomabechi v. Japan, 14 Minshfi 1206 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 8, 1960), 7 Minshfi 305 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Apr. 15, 1953); Sakagami v. Japan, 7 Minshfi 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 8, 1953)).
In 1973, the Supreme Court declared a Diet statute unconstitutional for the first time. The Court
examined whether Article 200 of the Criminal Code unconstitutionally imposed heavier penalties for
committing patricide as opposed to regular homicide. The Supreme Court had addressed this same
issue in 1950 and upheld the statute on the ground that such discrimination was quite natural. On
reexamination 23 years later, the Court held Article 200 unconstitutional because the heavier penalty
for patricide violated Article 4 (equality under the law) of the Constitution. This decision was
unpopular with members of the LDP because reverence for lineal ascendants is commonly accepted
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judicial review did not start the emergence of an activist judiciary. These
decisions have not affected significant social change.' 22 However, the
reluctance on the part of the Japanese Supreme Court to exercise the power
of judicial review should not be criticized. "Whereas the United States
Supreme Court used its power of judicial review to invalidate congressional
acts only twice in the first sixty-eight years of existence, the Japanese Supreme
1 23
Court has held five statutes unconstitutional in only half that time."
The Japanese Supreme Court has been very conservative in its
constitutional interpretation and adjudication. Most scholars attribute this
conservative trend to the political dominance in postwarJapan of the LDP and
to the Supreme Court appointment process. After the initial appointments,
all Supreme Court justices appointed under the Constitution of 1947 were
appointed by the leadership of the LDP or its conservative forerunners and,
for the most part, reflect the social, economic, cultural, and political values of
the party membership.
Japan has been in an era of constitutional government in which strong
executive powers have been justified on the grounds that such power is
necessary to achieve economic success and to catch up to the prosperity of the
western world. Strong executive power often results in suppression of
political opposition and limitations on judicial independence as law supports
economic development at the expense of civil liberties. The judiciary
sacrifices the goal of social justice to protect property rights; it is supported in
1 24
this by the executive and legislative branches of government.
Many Western scholars put great emphasis on the judicial function and its
importance for an understanding of law in society.' 2 5 Some argue that the
judiciary is an instrument of social control and preserves the status quo of the
economic elite. If one accepts the premise that there are distinct differences
between the roles of judges and legislators, then this argument loses force.
The legislature formulates and implements social, economic, and political
policies that articulate the values of a democratic society. Thejudiciary's role
is much more limited. Although particular judicial decisions may have a
significant social, economic, and political impact, such impact is relatively
limited and can be circumvented by the legislature if the decisions are so
contrary to prevailing values that they inspire significant opposition. If the
decisions merely reflect the prevailing trend, then they serve to accelerate
change in that direction. Judges resolve individual disputes with reference to
in Japan; the Diet has yet to amend or delete Article 200. Okudaira, Some Consideration of the
Constitution ofJapan, 29 ANNALS INST. SOC. ScI. 90, 107 (1987).

122. Several decisions have not been followed by the Diet. Two decisions in 1976 and 1985
found that a serious discrepancy between population and the number of allotted seats in the House
of Representatives was so great that it was constitutionally impermissible. The Diet has failed to
correct this apportionment problem. See Hata, Malapportionment of Representation in the National Diet,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1990, at 35.

123. See, supra note 5, at 350.
124. Y. YOSHIDA, supra note 119, at 13.
125. Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of
American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984).
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precedent and to social, economic, and political conditions, but the judiciary
is simply "incapable of receiving the massive data inputs that are
12 6
indispensable for broad-gauge social engineering."'
The Japanese judiciary is not in a position to be an instrument for social,
economic, and political change; instead, it performs the conservative task of
preserving basic civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and recognized
by the Diet and a majority of the Japanese population.

126. Lewis, The Unbalanced Critical Legal Scholars and Their Overbalanced Critics, 40 MERCER L. REV.
913, 926 (1989).

